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So What Is the Real Legacy 
of Oakes? 
Two Decades of Proportionality 
Analysis under the Canadian 
Charter’s Section 1 
Sujit Choudhry* 
I. OAKES AND BRIAN DICKSON 
As we reflect upon the 20th anniversary of R. v. Oakes,1 it is hard not to 
think of Brian Dickson C.J., for the two are inextricably tied together in 
the Canadian constitutional imagination. This is true not only for the 
obvious reason that the former Chief Justice penned the majority 
judgment, but also because Oakes has come to be synonymous with the 
former Chief Justice’s broader jurisprudential legacy. For along with R. 
v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,2 Hunter v. Southam Inc.,3 Singh v. Canada 
(Minister of Immigration and Employment),4 and Reference re Motor 
Vehicle Act (British Columbia), s. 94 , 5 Oakes set the tone for the early 
years of the Dickson Court. Oakes spoke in a boldness and confidence 
that permeated the Court’s early Charter case law. Indeed, it clarified the 
Court’s interpretive methodology for Charter cases, perhaps most 
centrally that rights are of presumptive importance, and limitations the 
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1
 [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
2
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
3
 [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
4
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 11, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [hereinafter “Singh”]. 
5
 [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 [hereinafter “B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference”]. 
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exception that are only acceptable if governments meet a demanding test 
of justification. The citation of Oakes by courts in Antigua and 
Barbuda,6 Australia,7 Fiji,8 Hong Kong,9 Ireland,10 Israel,11 Jamaica,12 
Namibia,13 South Africa,14 the United Kingdom,15 Vanuatu16 and 
Zimbabwe17 has made Oakes one of the central models for rights-based 
constitutional adjudication, and has only confirmed its status as the 
poster-child of the Dickson Court.  
So the Court’s almost immediate retreat from Oakes in Edwards 
Books, acknowledged and consolidated soon thereafter by Irwin Toy 
Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General),18 is of broader constitutional 
significance, both domestically and abroad. If Oakes was a model for 
how to interpret the Charter, and how rights-protecting documents in 
other jurisdictions should be construed, the question is what kind of 
model it remains two decades on.19 In an important sense, this is a 
completion of the circle, given the importance of comparative models to 
the drafting of section 1.20 And rather than merely telling us something 
                                                                                                            
6
 Attorney-General & Anor v. Goodwin & Ors, [1999] I.C.H.R.L. 143. 
7
 Kartinyeri v. The Commonwealth, [1998] HCA 22; Mulholland v. Australian Electoral 
Commission, [2004] HCA 41. 
8
 Chaudhry v. Attorney-General, [1999] FJCA 28. 
9
 R. v. Sin Yau Ming, [1991] HKCA 96. 
10
 Blascaod Mor Teoranta v. Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland, [1998] IEHC 38. 
11
 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49 P.D. 221; Ron Menachem 
v. Minister of Transportation, P.D. 57(1) 2345. 
12
 Jamaica Bar Association v. Ernest Smith & Company, [2003] JMSC 17. 
13
 Kauesa v. Minister of Home Affairs & Ors, [1995] I.C.H.R.L. 56. 
14
 S v. Zuma, 1995 (2) SA 642; S v. Coetzee, 1997 (3) SA 527; S v. Manamela, 2000 (3) 
SA 1; Case v. Minister of Safety and Security, 1996 (3) SA 617; S v. Bhulwana, 1996 (1) SA 388; S 
v. Singo, 2002 (4) SA 858. 
15
 Ex Parte Kebeline, [1999] UKHL 43; R. v. Lambert, [2001] UKHL 37; A (FC) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56. 
16
 In re the Constitution, Korman v. Natapei, [1997] VUSC 46. 
17
 Chavunduka v. Minister of Home Affairs, [2000] I.C.H.R.L. 34. 
18
 [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 [hereinafter “Irwin Toy”]; R. v. Edwards 
Books & Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713]. 
19
 I have explored the use of comparative models in constitutional adjudication in: 
“Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative Constitutional 
Interpretation” (1999) 74(3) Indiana L.J. 819; S. Choudhry, “The Lochner Era and Comparative 
Constitutionalism” (2004) 2(1) Int’l J. Const. L. 1; S. Choudhry, “Migration as a New Metaphor in 
Comparative Constitutional Law” in S. Choudhry, ed., The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2006). 
20
 B. Hovius, “The Limitation Clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights: A 
Guide for the Application of Section 1 of the Charter” (1985) 17 Ottawa L. Rev. 213; L.E. 
Weinrib, “Canada’s Charter of Rights: Paradigm Lost?” (2002) 6 Rev. Const. Stud. 119. 
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about section 1, 20 years of the Court’s coming to terms with Oakes 
sheds light on its evolving self-understanding of the judicial role under 
the Charter. The fate of Oakes holds broader lessons for the fate of the 
Charter and the judicial review of rights-protecting constitutional 
instruments more generally. 
There is a dominant narrative on what the true legacy of Oakes and 
the retreat from Oakes are.21 The argument is that Oakes set out a 
uniform approach for assessing justifiable limitations on Charter rights 
irrespective of differences in context, but that in the decade following 
Oakes, the Court searched for criteria of deference, to reliably and 
predictably categorize cases where deference was warranted and those 
where it was not. These categories were not applied consistently by the 
Court, and, indeed, produced disagreement within the Court over how 
they should be applied in specific cases. Underlying both trends were 
concerns regarding the cogency of the distinctions employed by the 
Court to delineate the boundaries of these categories. The broader lesson 
of Oakes is the need to tailor judicial review to the unique context of 
each case.  
Although the dominant narrative captures much of Oakes’ legacy, it 
misses much of what is at stake in many recent section 1 cases, and by 
implication, what the true legacy of Oakes and the retreat from Oakes 
are. In my view, Oakes created an enormous institutional dilemma for 
the Court, by setting up a conflict between the demand for definitive 
proof to support each stage of the section 1 analysis, and the reality of 
policy making under conditions of factual uncertainty. And so the 
legacy of Oakes is that the central question of section 1 is how the Court 
                                                                                                            
21
 For example, see D.M. Beatty, Talking Heads and the Supremes: The Canadian 
Production of Constitutional Review (Toronto: Carswell, 1990), ch. 3; E. Mendes, “In Search of a 
Theory of Social Justice: The Supreme Court Reconceives the Oakes Test” (1990) 24 R.J.T. 1; R. 
Elliot, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1989-90 Term” (1991) 2 S.C.L.R. (2d) 83; R. 
Knopff & F.L. Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1992), at 45-47; A. Lajoie 
& H. Qullinan, “Emerging Constitutional Norms: Continuous Judicial Amendment of the 
Constitution — The Proportionality Test as a Moving Target” (1992) 55 L. & Contemp. Prob. 285; 
C.M. Dassios & C.P. Prophet, “Charter Section 1: The Decline of Grand Unified Theory and the 
Trend Towards Deference in the Supreme Court of Canada” (1993) 15 Advocates’ Q. 289; J.L. 
Hiebert, Limiting Rights: The Dilemma of Judicial Review (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1996), ch. 4; K. Roach, The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or 
Democratic Dialogue (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2001), ch. 9; C.D. Bredt & A.M. Dodek, “The 
Increasing Irrelevance of Section 1 of the Charter” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 175; E. Mendes, “The 
Crucible of the Charter: Judicial Principles v. Judicial Deference in the Context of Section 1” 
(2005) 27 S.C.L.R. (2d) 47; J.B. Kelly, Governing with the Charter (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 
ch. 5. 
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should allocate the risk of factual uncertainty when governments 
legislate under conditions of imperfect information. RJR-MacDonald v. 
Canada (Attorney General)22 is the pivotal case here, because it brought 
home how the central debate in many section 1 cases is the quality of 
the evidentiary record. But not only has the Court failed to recognize 
this as a central question; it has failed to adopt a consistent approach in 
how it answers it.23 Two recent examples which lie at the heart of this 
counter-narrative are Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney 
General)24 and Harper v. Canada (Attorney General).25 Although these 
cases have attracted minimal attention from constitutional scholars for 
their broader importance to the Court’s understanding of the judicial 
role under the Charter, they warrant close attention because they tell us 
that there is another legacy of Oakes.26  
Understanding these problems to be the legacy of Oakes allows us 
to view judgments outside the section 1 context in a different light. In 
my conclusion, I will link my counter-narrative to the Court’s recent 
decision in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),27 in which the Court 
struck down Quebec’s ban on private health insurance. Although the 
principal focus of Chaoulli was section 7, I read it through the lens of 
the general problem of how to fashion judicial review in a rights-
protecting democracy where governments often legislate with imperfect 
information. Neither the majority nor the dissenting judges in that case 
understood the case in these terms. As a consequence, they asked 
themselves the wrong question. Getting the legacy of Oakes right would 
have led them to avoid this mistake. 
                                                                                                            
22
 [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 [hereinafter “RJR-MacDonald”]. 
23
 And as the Court’s decisions in R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 2003 SCC 74 
[hereinafter “Malmo-Levine”] and R. v. Labaye, [2005] S.C.J. No. 83, 2005 SCC 80, illustrate, 
similar questions arise outside the s. 1 context, and the Court has sent contradictory signals there as 
well.  
24
 [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”]. 
25
 [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 [hereinafter “Harper”]. 
26
 Exceptions include P. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, vol. 2, looseleaf ed. 
(Scarborough: Carswell, 1997), sec. 35.4; R.E. Charney, “Evidence in Charter Cases: Expert 
Evidence and Proving Purpose” (2004) 16 N.J.C.L. 1; R.E. Charney & Z. Green, “Prophets of 
Doom, Seers of Fortune: 20 Years of Expert Evidence under the Oakes Test”, this volume; and the 
Rt. Hon. A. Lamer, “Canada’s Legal Revolution: Judging in the Age of the Charter of Rights” 
(1994) 28 Isr. L. Rev. 579, at 582-83. 
27
 [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, 2005 SCC 35 [hereinafter “Chaoulli”]. 
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II. THE DOMINANT NARRATIVE  
The details of the dominant narrative are widely known. Section 1 was 
at play in a number of early Charter judgments, in which the Court 
offered some preliminary observations on how it would interpret the 
provision.28 But it was not until 1986 that the Court devoted sustained 
attention to section 1, in a pair of judgments handed down 10 months 
apart. In Oakes, Dickson C.J. set out the analytical framework 
governing section 1 interpretation, which, despite two decades of 
doctrinal elaboration, qualification and modification, still provides the 
basic framework within which limitations analysis is conducted. Oakes 
states that parties seeking to uphold a rights-violation must satisfy a 
four-part test. First, the reason for the rights-violation must be “pressing 
and substantial”,29 which entails that the legislative objective must 
further the values of the “free and democratic society” referred to by the 
text of section 1. These values encompass a broad but not all-inclusive 
set of values which underlie Charter rights which are also guaranteed by 
section 1, and for that reason are the exclusive reasons that can justify 
their limitation.30 The next three steps together constitute the well-
known proportionality test. Thus, there must be a “rational connection” 
between the rights-infringing measure and the objective, interpreted by 
the Court in Oakes to require that the means chosen be “carefully 
designed” so as to minimize problems of over-inclusion. Moreover, the 
measure must be the least restrictive means — i.e., the means which 
impairs the right “as little as possible” — for realizing the government’s 
objective. Finally, the deleterious effects of the measure must be 
proportionate to the importance of the objective.31 On the facts of Oakes 
itself, the Court considered a challenge to a reverse onus provision 
which presumed the intent to traffic narcotics from the mere fact of 
                                                                                                            
28
 These early judgments were of Quebec (Attorney General) v. Quebec Assn. of Protestant 
School Boards, [1984] S.C.J. No. 31, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66; Singh, supra, note 4; Big M, supra, note 
2, and the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 5. 
29
 Oakes, supra, note 1, at 138. 
30
 Id., listed the values of a free and democratic society in the following famous passage 
(at 136): 
The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and democratic 
society which I believe embody, to name but a few, respect for the inherent dignity of the 
human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation of a wide variety 
of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society. 
31
 Id., at 140. 
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possession. The Court found the objective underlying the provision — 
to protect society from the evils of drug trafficking — to be pressing and 
substantial (although puzzlingly, it made no attempt to tie this objective 
to the values of a free and democratic society). But the provision failed 
the rational connection test because it was over-inclusive, since it 
inferred the intent to traffic in cases of possession in which no such 
intent was present. 
The clear message sent by Oakes is that it sets out a “stringent 
standard of justification”.32 Thus, rights are the norm and of presumptive 
importance, and cannot be limited unless “the exceptional criteria which 
justify their being limited” are met.33 Lorraine Weinrib correctly 
observed that on Oakes, “[t]he state will seldom satisfy section 1 
justification because the supreme law states that certain rights and 
freedoms are to be honoured in the normal course”.34 In this respect, 
Oakes confirmed the views of commentators writing before the 
judgment that the drafting history of section 1 evinced a legislative 
intention that the provision be strictly interpreted to the benefit of rights-
claimants.35 Moreover, although Oakes stated that “the nature of the 
proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances”36 the test 
in Oakes itself was framed in abstract terms which did not invite courts 
to differentiate its application in future appeals that might differ 
radically from Oakes itself, either with respect to the rights at play or the 
policy context.  
But Oakes was followed less than ten months later by R. v. Edwards 
Books & Art Ltd.,37 in which superficially, the Court invoked and 
applied Oakes as precedent. But notwithstanding that Dickson C.J. 
wrote both judgments, Edwards Books was radically different. The key 
shifts concerned the rational connection and minimal impairment 
components of the proportionality analysis. Since Oakes had interpreted 
                                                                                                            
32
 Id., at 136. 
33
 Id., at 137. 
34
 L.E. Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the Charter” (1988) 
10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 492. For a similar but critical view of the implications of the strictness of 
Oakes, see P.A. Chapman, “The Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms” (1986) O.H.L.J. 867. 
35
 T.J. Christian, “The Limitation of Liberty: A Consideration of Section 1 of the Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms” (1982) 16 U.B.C. L. Rev. 105, at 107; W.E. Conklin, “Interpreting and 
Applying The Limitations Clause; An Analysis of Section 1” (1982) 4 S.C.L.R. 75, at 81 to 82. 
36
 Oakes, supra, note 1, at 139. 
37
 [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 [hereinafter “Edwards Books”]. 
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the requirement of fit between means and ends to preclude legislative 
over-inclusion, it was thought that the same would apply to problems of 
legislative under-inclusion. Edwards Books presented two such gaps 
between legislative ends and means, because notwithstanding the broad 
goal of providing a common pause day, the legislation only applied to 
the retail sector, and, even there, contained significant exceptions. But 
the Court responded by justifying the limited scope of the legislation, 
suggesting that a legislature could restrict its efforts to sectors “in which 
there appear to be particularly urgent concerns or to constituencies that 
seem especially needy”, and, more generally, that “[l]egislative choices 
regarding alternative forms of business regulation … need not be tuned 
with great precision in order to withstand judicial scrutiny”, since 
“[s]implicity and administrative convenience are legitimate concerns”.38 
Now the obvious question was why the same kinds of arguments could 
not have been deployed in Oakes itself, given the obvious utility of 
reverse onuses to the effectiveness of criminal prosecution. But 
Edwards Books neither explicitly disapproved of Oakes nor explained 
why it should operate so differently in this context.  
And the same sorts of questions arose from the Court’s minimal 
impairment analysis. Again, without explicit acknowledgment, the 
Court modified Oakes, stipulating that the challenged measure need 
only impair Charter rights “as little as is reasonably possible” and 
asking “whether there is some reasonable alternative scheme”, as 
opposed to whether the measure chosen was the least intrusive one 
available.39 The Court wrestled openly with the various trade-offs 
involved in alternatives to the Sunday closing law. Thus, the Court 
reasoned that an employee’s right to refuse work on Sundays would fall 
prey to “the subtle coercive pressure which an employer can exert on an 
employee”.40 A complete exemption for retailers who could demonstrate 
“a sincerely held religious belief requiring them to close their stores on a 
day other than Sunday”41 was also undesirable. It would mean that 
employees in the retail sector — a particularly vulnerable group — 
would have little realistic option but to work on Sundays, and the 
legislature was entitled to give priority to employee interests in 
observing a common pause day over the commercial interests of 
                                                                                                            
38
 Id., at 772. 
39
 Id., at 772. 
40
 Id., at 773. 
41
 Id., at 773. 
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employers. Moreover, the exemption would require a distasteful state-
conducted inquiry into religious beliefs, and again, the state was entitled 
to prefer a scheme which was less comprehensive but which avoided 
such a process. And in addition to reasons particular to the appeal, 
Edwards Books stated more generally that “[t]he courts are not called 
upon to substitute judicial opinions for legislative ones”, that “[b]y its 
nature, legislation must, to some degree, cut across individual 
circumstances in order to establish general rules”, and that deference 
was mandated lest the Charter “simply become an instrument of better 
situated individuals to roll back legislation which has as its object the 
improvement of the condition of less advantaged persons”.42 Although 
the Court did not reach the minimal impairment stage of the 
proportionality analysis in Oakes, once again, the question raised by 
Edwards Books was why similar factors were not even signalled by the 
Court just a few months earlier.  
Academic commentators quickly noted that something was afoot.43 
Robin Elliot observed that when “Oakes was delivered, the decision 
appeared to settle what had become a vexing and very important 
question — how was s. 1 of the Charter to be applied?”, but that 
Edwards Books made it abundantly clear “that the Court is far from ad 
idem on the matter of how s. 1 is to be applied”.44 Although Oakes 
purported to be “comprehensive in scope”, Elliot presciently suggested 
that “[t]he prospect that we will see a single, uniform approach to s. 1 
emerging from the Court in the foreseeable future is dim indeed”.45 
Andrew Petter and Patrick Monahan went even further, arguing that 
“judges have recoiled from all but the formal trappings of the Oakes 
test”.46 The net result was that the Court “still has the stringent Oakes 
test sitting on the shelf waiting to be dusted off for use at an appropriate 
moment … any time that the Court wants to strike down a law”, but 
                                                                                                            
42
 Id., at 782, 777, and 779. 
43
 But compare A.C. Hutchison, Waiting for Coraf: A Critique of Law and Rights 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at, 50-55, and J. Bakan, Just Words: Constitutional 
Rights and Social Wrongs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), at 27-30, who emphasize 
the indeterminacy of the Oakes test, a view which would seem to minimize the differences between 
Edwards Books and Oakes. 
44
 R.M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — the Erosion of the 
Common Front” (1987) 12 Queen’s L.J. 277, at 339. 
45
 Id., at 340. 
46
 A.J. Petter & P.J. Monahan, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1986-87 Term” 
(1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 61, at 66. 
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“[o]n the other hand when they are dealing a law with which they are 
relatively sympathetic, the Court is able to step aside and basically allow 
the legislature to do what it wants”.47  
Clearly, the Court needed to explain exactly how Oakes and 
Edwards Books fit together. And the scholarly literature offered some 
preliminary suggestions. Elliot suggested, for example, that the strict 
approach to rational connection in Oakes may have flowed from the 
consequence of over-inclusion — “that innocent people might be 
convicted of a serious criminal offence”.48 Presumably, the stakes were 
somewhat lower in Edwards Books, which arose outside the criminal 
context. Along a similar vein, Petter and Monahan astutely observed 
that the Court was far less deferential in its criminal Charter cases than 
in the non-criminal context, and that while “the cases in which the 
Court’s rhetoric and reasons have been most deferential have all been 
non-criminal cases … the Court has continued to operate on the basis of 
the paradigm developed in its early cases” in the criminal law area.49 
The rationale for this pattern of decisions, they suggested, might flow 
from the Court’s assessment that “[s]upervision of the criminal process 
is a staple item on the judicial menu”, and the Court is able in these 
cases “to maintain the illusion that the judiciary is choosing between the 
state and the individual rather than between the competing interests of 
individuals or groups”, whereas the non-criminal cases raised “broad 
issues of social policy” where “the trade-offs inherent in rights litigation 
are more visible”.50 
The Court offered a partial response to these academic criticisms 
(albeit without citing them) in Irwin Toy and subsequent cases. To some 
extent, the Court simply continued the unannounced yet transparent 
trend toward deference by adopting less stringent interpretations of the 
first two steps of the Oakes test in almost every case that came before 
it.51 The need for a “pressing and substantial objective” that furthered 
the values of a free and democratic society set out in Oakes was quietly 
replaced with the less demanding requirement that the objective merely 
                                                                                                            
47
 Id., at 95. 
48
 R.M. Elliot, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1 — the Erosion of the 
Common Front”, supra, note 44, at 318. 
49
 A.J. Petter & P.J. Monahan, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1986-87 Term”, 
supra, note 46, at 68-69. 
50
 Id., at 69. 
51
 R.M. Elliot, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 1989-90 Term”, supra, note 21, 
at 139-144. 
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be “valid”52 or “sufficiently important”.53 Indeed, given that Oakes and 
Edwards Books both failed to connect the objectives of the challenged 
                                                                                                            
52
 R. v. Whyte, [1988] S.C.J. No. 63, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3. 
53
 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] S.C.J. No. 52, 
[1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 [hereinafter “Prostitution Reference”].  
However, some more recent decisions point to a more demanding application of this 
requirement of the Oakes test. In R. v. Advance Cutting and Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, 2001 
SCC 70 [hereinafter “Advance Cutting”], the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to the unique 
system of collective bargaining which governs the Quebec construction industry. Employers can 
only hire workers who hold a competency certificate, and the regime grants five unions the 
monopoly to issue these certificates. In order to obtain a certificate, legislation requires that a 
worker join one of these five legislatively recognized unions. Moreover, the legislation establishes 
regional quotas as to the maximum number of certificates that can be issued. The majority argued 
that the purpose underlying this regime was to bring industrial peace to the construction industry, 
and that the means chosen met the test of proportionality. The dissenting judges (per Bastarache J.) 
rejected this objective, on the basis that Oakes mandated reviewing courts to consider “the 
objective of the legislation as it stands today”, as opposed to the historical reasons for which it was 
enacted (at para. 45). Justice Bastarache then went on to reject two contemporary objectives for the 
legislation — “to have structured collective bargaining and to provide for competency 
requirements” — because he could not accept “that these are the true objectives of the legislation” 
(at para. 46). Justice Bastarache then found no rational connection between the mandatory union 
membership and regional quotas and the legislation’s purported objectives. What was missing from 
his analysis is what he considered the true objectives to actually be, and how these objectives fared 
under Oakes. A plausible way of reading the judgment is that Bastarache J. considered the true 
objective underlying the challenged measures to be to accord a monopoly to a limited number of 
construction unions and to restrict the supply of construction workers in exchange for labour peace, 
and that this objective was insufficiently important under Oakes. The legislation, in other words, 
was a form of illegitimate special-interest legislation which protected the interests of five 
construction unions from economic competition for no offsetting public interest.  
Figueroa v. Canada, [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, 2003 SCC 37 [hereinafter “Figueroa”], likewise 
can be read in a similar way. Under challenge there was a 50-candidate threshold for political 
parties to be registered. Registered political parties possess the right to issue tax receipts for 
donations received outside the election period, and to extend to candidates the right to transfer 
unspent election funds to the party. Moreover, candidates of registered parties can include their 
party affiliation on an election ballot. The Court found no rational connection between these 
measures and the purported objectives underlying the scheme: to improve the effectiveness of the 
electoral process, to protect the integrity of the electoral financing regime, and to increase the 
possibility of a stable Parliament. The Court’s failure to find a rational connection, of course, 
suggests that the true objective may have been rather different — to protect larger political parties 
from electoral competition to the detriment of the public interest. And Figueroa can be read as 
holding that that objective cannot justify a limitation on s. 3. In other words, Figueroa holds that 
the Charter will prohibit democratic lock-ups. 
In addition, the Court has recently reaffirmed its earlier precedents that discriminatory 
objectives (Big M) and fiscal considerations (Singh, B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference) are 
insufficiently important to justify the limitation of Charter rights: Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. 
No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [hereinafter “Vriend”], L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissenting reasons in 
Nova Scotia v. Walsh, [2002] S.C.J. No. 84, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 325 [hereinafter “Walsh”] 
(discriminatory objectives) and Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova 
Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Laseur, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 (fiscal 
considerations). But the Court has left open the door to fiscal emergencies counting as a legitimate 
reason to limit Charter rights: Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. N.A.P.E., [2004] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 381. 
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measures in those appeals to the values of a free and democratic society, 
this move hardly came as a surprise. Similarly, the need for careful 
legislative design to minimize the possibility of over- and under-
inclusion at the rational connection stage — applied by Oakes, but then 
diluted by Edwards Books — was replaced with the much less onerous 
requirement that the means chosen simply further the legislative 
objective.54 
But it was principally the development of the minimal impairment 
test which drove the jurisprudence. Here, the Court explicitly 
acknowledged that it had departed, and would continue to depart, from 
the strictness of Oakes. Yet rather than adopting an across-the-board 
demobilization in every case — as it had with respect to the first two 
stages of the Oakes test — it instead attempted to draw a series of 
categorical distinctions to identify cases in which it should defer under 
section 1, asking only whether it could be said that the government had 
a “reasonable basis”55 for concluding that it had impaired the right as 
little as possible, and those where it should not.56 The Court relied on a 
diverse set of criteria which often overlapped in individual cases, 
providing multiple grounds for deference.57 
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 Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario, [1990] S.C.J. No. 65, [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 232 [hereinafter “Rocket”]. Also see P.W. Hogg, “Section 1 Revisited” (1992) 1 N.J.C.L. 1.  
However, in three recent sets of cases, the Court has moved away from the deferential, 
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dissenting reasons in Walsh; (b) cases where the means chosen would actually cause the mischief 
the legislation seeks to cure: see the dissenting reasons of Cory and Iacobucci JJ. in Delisle v. 
Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R 989, and the concurring 
reasons of L’Heureux-Dubé J. in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, 
[2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 [hereinafter “Dunmore”]; and (c) cases involving the restriction of the right to 
vote guaranteed by s. 3, where the means are only intelligible on the basis of assumptions that 
communicate a lack of respect for democracy: Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 
S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 [hereinafter “Sauvé”]. This development warrants more in-depth 
analysis than I can provide here, particularly given that the “minimal rationality” version of the 
rational connection test is still routinely used by the Court. 
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 Irwin Toy, supra, note 18, at 994. 
56
 A. Lokan, “The Rise and Fall of Doctrine Under Section 1 of the Charter” (1992) 24 
Ottawa L. Rev. 163. 
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 For an early prediction that this would happen, see N. Finkelstein, “Section 1: The 
Standard for Assessing Restrictive Government Actions and the Charter’s Code of Procedure and 
Evidence” (1983-4) 9 Queen’s L.J. 143. For a puzzling analysis of the 11 years of s. 1 case law 
subsequent to Oakes that omits detailed discussion of these doctrinal distinctions, see L.E. 
Trakman, W. Cole-Hamilton & S. Gatien, “R. v. Oakes 1986-1997: Back to the Drawing Board” 
(1998) 36 O.H.L.J. 83. 
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One strategy was to differentiate different policy areas based on 
comparative institutional advantage or relative judicial expertise. Thus, 
in Irwin Toy, the Court indicated it would not defer in the criminal 
justice context, or, for that matter, whenever “the government’s purpose 
relates to maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judicial 
system”, because of its “accumulated experience in dealing with such 
questions”.58 Indeed, the judiciary is a central government actor in the 
criminal justice system. By contrast, the Court lacks relative expertise 
vis-à-vis other branches of government in other contexts, for example, 
labour relations or commercial regulation. This distinction explained the 
Court’s differing approaches in Oakes (a criminal law case) and 
Edwards Books (which concerned the regulation of the retail industry). 
It also accounted for the Court’s subsequent deference under section 1 
in two decisions arising in the labour relations context, McKinney v. 
University of Guelph59 and Advance Cutting, where the Court extended 
its historic deference to labour boards and arbitrators to legislatively-set 
labour policy — and in the latter case, the unique need to secure labour 
peace in the Quebec construction sector. 
A second strategy was to differentiate cases according to the 
competing interests at stake, on the theory that both the range and 
relative weight of different interests should guide the Court’s choice of 
standard. On one reading, Irwin Toy’s criminal versus non-criminal 
distinction was a proxy for this underlying set of considerations. Thus, 
in the criminal law context, the state is “the singular antagonist” of the 
rights-claimant, where the state acts “on behalf of the whole 
community”.60 By contrast, in other situations, the state attempts to 
mediate “competing claims among different groups”.61 The claim here is 
that when the state acts on behalf of third parties whose interests are 
opposed to those of the rights-claimant, the interests of these individuals 
are a legitimate counter-weight to the rights of Charter-claimants. The 
idea is that some successful Charter claims have real costs for important 
interests of identifiable individuals whom the state acts to protect. 
Enforcing the Charter is therefore not costless in real human terms — 
rights claims are redistributive, producing winners and losers. 
Constitutional adjudication is a form of interest-balancing which is 
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 Irwin Toy, supra, note 18, at 994. 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 122, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [hereinafter “McKinney”]. 
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 Irwin Toy, supra, note 18, at 994. 
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 Id., at 993. 
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difficult to distinguish in many cases from legislative decision-making, 
counselling deference. By contrast, when the state promotes the interests 
of the “community”, successful claims apparently do not impose the 
same costs, and the balance is more heavily tilted in favour of the rights-
claimant. Criminal justice falls into the former category, while social 
and economic policy into the latter. Edwards Books, McKinney and 
Advance Cutting can be explained as cases in which the Court deferred 
on the presence of competing interests, and Oakes as a case in which the 
lack of deference is attributable to the absence of competing interests. 
This strategy generated a number of variations. For example, the 
Court reasoned that the interests of third parties count even more as a 
reason for deference when the third parties are vulnerable groups to 
whose interests the state grants priority, or whom the state protects.62 
Thus, the Court has deferred when legislation protects employees 
(Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson),63 or at least those who are 
“low-skilled, non-union and poorly educated” (Edwards Books),64 and 
children (Irwin Toy, R. v. Sharpe).65 Arguably, although not explicitly 
invoked, this consideration can also explain the Court’s deference to 
measures which it described as protecting the interests of members of 
racial and religious minorities (R. v. Keegstra)66 and women (R. v. 
Butler67).68 Another strand of this line of analysis was to focus on 
interest balancing in the context of the allocation of scarce public 
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 R. Colker, “Section 1, Contextuality, and the Anti-Disadvantage Principle” (1992) 42 
U.T.L.J. 77. It also follows that when legislation disadvantages members of a vulnerable group, 
then the Court should show less deference under s. 1. Arguably, this position was adopted and 
applied by the Court in U.F.C.W., Local 1518 v. KMart Canada, [1999] S.C.J. No. 44, [1999] 2 
S.C.R. 1083 [hereinafter “KMart”], where the Court refused to defer to a legislative prohibition on 
secondary protection, inter alia, because (at para. 68) “those who are subject to the legislative 
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dissenting reasons in Adler v. Ontario, [1996] S.C.J. No. 110, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609; Cory and 
Iacobucci’s JJ.’s joint dissent in Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 
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 [1989] S.C.J. No. 45, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038. 
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 Edwards Books, supra, note 37, at 778. 
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 [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 [hereinafter “Sharpe”]. 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter “Keegstra”]. 
67
 [1992] S.C.J. No. 15, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 [hereinafter “Butler”]. 
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 In addition, members of the Court have suggested that smokers, who tend to be “the 
young and the less educated”, should also be regarded as a vulnerable group (RJR-MacDonald, 
supra, note 22, at para. 66 (per La Forest J.)), as should consumers of cigarettes, because “the 
sophistication of advertising campaigns … creates an enormous power differential between these 
companies and tobacco consumers” (RJR-MacDonald, supra, note 22, at para. 76).  
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resources, a situation alluded to by Irwin Toy itself. Thus, in McKinney, 
a reason offered by the Court for rejecting the constitutional challenge 
to a university’s mandatory retirement policies was that one reason for 
mandatory retirement was to give universities flexibility in distributing 
scarce resources among faculty “to enhance and maintain their capacity 
to seek and maintain excellence”.69 McKinney also introduced the much-
criticized doctrine of incrementalism, whereby scarce resources counted 
as a reason to defer, so as to permit the legislature to “deal with 
problems one step at a time” as opposed to obliging it “to deal with all 
aspects of a problem at once”.70 The most infamous application of this 
doctrine was Sopinka J.’s concurring judgment in Egan v. Canada,71 in 
which he held that the denial of old age security to same sex couples 
was minimally impairing because “equating same-sex couples with 
heterosexual spouses, either married or common law, is still regarded as 
a novel concept”.72 A final variation on this approach was to elevate the 
interests of third parties to the constitutional level, so that the state can 
be seen as protecting their Charter rights by limiting the Charter rights 
of others. So Keegstra can be understood as a case in which legislation 
protected the rights to freedom of expression of racial and religious 
minorities by protecting them from the harm of silencing, and Edwards 
Books a case where Sunday closing legislation protected the right to 
freedom of religion of Sunday-observing retail employees. 
A third strategy, which flowed from the second, was to downgrade 
the importance of the constitutional right at stake. Just as the interests of 
third parties might counter-balance the claims of rights-claimants, the 
latter might be easier to outweigh if they are less important. The Court 
developed this approach from the purposive approach to rights-
interpretation set out in Big M, in which the interpretation of the scope 
of a Charter right proceeds from an account of the interests it is meant to 
protect. The Court reasoned that since some protected activity bore an 
attenuated connection to these interests, it warranted less constitutional 
protection. This line of analysis was developed principally in the context 
of freedom of expression, where the Court distinguished between core 
and peripheral expression. The interests underlying section 2(b) are the 
search for the truth, participation in social and political decision-
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 McKinney, supra, note 59, at 286. 
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 Id., at 317-18. 
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 [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 [hereinafter “Egan”]. 
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 Id., at 576. This aspect of Egan was overruled by the Court in Vriend, supra, note 53. 
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making, and individual self-fulfillment. The Court reasoned that 
commercial expression (Irwin Toy,73 Rocket, Prostitution Reference, 
Butler), hate speech (Keegstra, Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. 
Taylor,74 Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15),75 defamation 
(Hill v. Church of Scientology,76 R. v. Lucas)77 and sexually explicit 
expression (Butler, Sharpe, Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. 
Canada)78 are peripheral to the interests protected by section 2(b) and 
accordingly trigger deference under section 1. By implication, political 
speech lies at the core of section 2(b) (Thomson Newspapers, Harper) 
and laws which restrict it do not warrant any deference. The commercial 
character of operating a retail establishment on Sunday also appeared to 
lead the Court in Edwards Books to treat the rights-claim as being of 
lesser value. 
This elaborate set of categories and distinctions shaped the culture 
of constitutional argument for many years. But it has generated a 
number of problems. The first was that the Court has not followed its 
own schemas. In particular, notwithstanding Irwin Toy, it deferred in 
criminal law cases. Perhaps the most vivid examples are a series of 
appeals in which the Court turned back constitutional challenges to 
reverse onus provisions, notwithstanding that it had struck down such a 
provision in Oakes. In R. v. Chaulk,79 the Court upheld the presumption 
that an accused is presumed sane until the contrary was proved, and, in 
so doing, applied not Oakes but Edwards Books. Indeed, it actually 
extended Edwards Books, by clarifying that the question under minimal 
impairment was whether a less intrusive means was available that 
“would achieve the same objective as effectively” as the measure under 
challenge.80 Although the Court cited Irwin Toy, it did not refer to the 
distinction it drew between criminal and non-criminal matters, let alone 
attempt to apply it. Justice Iacobucci’s concurrence in the confusing set 
of judgments in R. v. Wholesale Travel81 takes a similar approach. But 
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 As read by the Supreme Court in Rocket, supra, note 54, at 251. 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892. 
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 [1996] S.C.J. No. 40, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825. 
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 [1995] S.C.J. No. 64, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130. 
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 [1998] S.C.J. No. 28, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439. 
78
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perhaps the most startling judgment is R. v. Downey,82 in which the 
Court upheld a reverse onus provision largely identical to the one which 
was challenged in Oakes — that presumed living off the avails of 
prostitution from the fact of living with a prostitute. Not surprisingly, 
McLachlin J. in dissent argued that Oakes meant that the law was 
unconstitutional because it was over-inclusive. But the majority — 
without even citing Irwin Toy — baldly stated that “Parliament is not 
required to choose the absolutely least intrusive alternative”.83 
More recently, the Court has not deferred in cases in which it was 
clearly faced with legislation which balanced conflicting economic 
interests. Consider M. v. H. Although the Court acknowledged that it 
should defer “where the impugned legislation involves the balancing of 
claims of competing groups”, it concluded that “[t]his is not such a 
case”, since “no group will be disadvantaged by granting members of 
same-sex couples access to … spousal support”.84 But while it is true 
that extending the spousal support regime to same sex couples does not 
harm the interests of opposite sex couples, it does affect the economic 
dynamics and balance of power within same sex relationships. Indeed, 
precisely for that reason, H. opposed M.’s constitutional challenge. 
Another example is Dunmore. The Court appeared to reason that since 
deference was warranted where the legislature acts on behalf of a 
vulnerable group, no deference is required when the legislature is 
balancing the interests of two different vulnerable groups — in 
Dunmore, family farmers and agricultural workers. However, even if 
there were vulnerable groups on both sides of the equation — such that 
vulnerability came off the table as a reason for deference — on Irwin 
Toy, the existence of competing interests alone is a reason for 
deference.85 Indeed, in this respect, it is hard to square Dunmore’s lack 
of deference with McKinney and Advance Cutting.86 
But perhaps a more serious problem which emerged is that the 
distinctions drawn by the Court were untenable. This became most 
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 M. v. H., supra, note 54, at para. 126. 
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apparent in the context of freedom of expression.87 Recall that the Court 
had classified political expression as core expression worthy of the 
highest level of constitutional protection. It became quickly apparent 
that expression which the Court had classified as peripheral was 
arguably political in character. Indeed, debates over how to classify 
expression were central to the doctrinal politics of each appeal. In 
Butler, for example, the intervener British Columbia Civil Liberties 
Association argued that since “sexual norms, behaviours and identities 
have a bearing on the structure of political life”, sexually explicit 
expression was in fact a form of political expression.88 This claim has 
been most forcefully advanced by sexual minorities, who argue that 
dominant portrayals of sexuality are part and parcel of a culture of 
discrimination. This view was at the heart of the submissions made by 
the appellants and the interveners LEAF and EGALE in Little Sisters. 
And an even clearer example is hate speech, whose political character is 
hard to dispute, notwithstanding its odious content.89 Indeed, the 
disagreement between the majority and dissent and Keegstra largely 
turned on whether hate speech should be understood as political 
expression — and hence as lying at the core of section 2(b). As 
McLachlin J. wrote in dissent, “[e]xperience shows that in actual cases 
it may be difficult to draw the line between speech which has value to 
democracy or social issues and speech which does not.”90  
Even in the commercial speech context, McLachlin J.’s plurality 
judgment in RJR-MacDonald offered rather qualified support for the 
Court’s earlier statements in Butler and the Prostitution Reference 
regarding the peripheral nature of advertising. Thus, she stated that it 
was “arguably less important than some forms of speech” and “may be 
easier to justify than other infringements”, and then proceeded to 
explain the positive value to consumers of tobacco advertising, 
emphasizing that commercial speech in general “should not be lightly 
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dismissed”.91 Justice LeBel in R. v. Guignard92 went even further, and 
recognized “the substantial value” of commercial expression because of 
“the very nature of our economic system, which is based on the 
existence of the free market” and “[t]he orderly operation of that market 
depends on businesses and consumers having access to abundant and 
diverse information”.93 Finally, the Court has refused to accord less 
constitutional protection to economically motivated expression in the 
labour relations context, in a pair of decisions on secondary picketing, 
KMart and R.W.D.S.U., Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages 
(West).94 The fact that economic interests motivate picketing by 
employees did not warrant deference, because working conditions and 
terms of employment “inform one’s identity, emotional health, and 
sense of self-worth” and “may impact on the personal lives of workers 
even outside their working hours”.95 
And even if one brackets the problem of how to categorize different 
kinds of expression, another problem arises. In several cases involving 
restrictions on freedom of expression, the considerations on the question 
of deference point in opposite directions. On the one hand, certain kinds 
of speech have been criminalized with the possibility of imprisonment, 
and therefore on Irwin Toy attract the highest standard of review under 
section 1. But on the other hand, the speech in many cases has been 
peripheral, which argues for deference. Thus, the peripheral nature of 
sexually explicit expression was acknowledged in Butler and Sharpe, 
and of hate speech in Keegstra, as a reason for deference. Likewise, in 
the Prostitution Reference, Dickson C.J. stated that “[i]t can hardly be 
said that communications regarding an economic transaction of sex for 
money lie at, or even near, the core of the guarantee of freedom of 
expression”,96 and deferred for that reason. So too in Butler, in which the 
Court reasoned that “the fact that the targeted material is expression 
which is motivated, in the overwhelming majority of cases, by economic 
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profit”97 reinforced the case for deference. But in none of these cases did 
the Court acknowledge the fact that the criminal nature of the 
prohibition counted against deference, let alone provide any additional 
criteria to sort out the conflict between the guidance provided by its 
previous case law. This is all the more bizarre given that Irwin Toy itself 
raised this problem, because it involved the regulation of commercial 
speech (warranting deference) through a regime that created criminal 
sanctions, including imprisonment (warranting no deference), albeit 
through provincial law. 
The difficulties raised by Keegstra, the Prostitution Reference, 
Butler, Sharpe, and Irwin Toy itself point to perhaps the most 
fundamental problem of all — the distinction between criminal law and 
other areas of public policy as a determinant of deference. The case in 
which the Court squarely faced this problem was RJR-MacDonald, in 
which restrictions on tobacco advertising were backed up by criminal 
sanctions. But as judges in both the majority and dissent noted, the 
legislation also balanced competing interests, as opposed to simply 
setting up the state as the singular antagonist of the individual. Justice 
La Forest listed the relevant interests who expressed views during the 
legislative deliberations surrounding the adoption of the challenged 
legislation: “medicine, transport, advertising, smokers’ rights, non-
smokers’ rights, and tobacco production”.98 Justice La Forest famously 
deferred in his dissent, and obviously viewed the criminal character of 
the legislation as not dispositive. Even though McLachlin J. did not 
defer, she acknowledged the fundamental challenge that understanding 
the legislation as simultaneously criminal and as balancing competing 
interests posed for Irwin Toy. “Such distinctions may not always be easy 
to apply”, she observed, since “the criminal law is generally seen as 
involving a contest between the state and the accused, but it also 
involves an allocation of priorities between the accused and the victim, 
actual or potential”.99 In other words, since crimes are not victimless, 
criminal laws necessarily and inescapably balance the competing 
interests of victims and the accused. Indeed, one could push this line of 
analysis even one step further, and argue that in many cases, the 
criminal law is a form of protective legislation which is designed to 
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protect vulnerable groups, and, indeed, the Charter interests (e.g., bodily 
integrity) of those groups. Perhaps the leading examples are sexual 
offences, the victims of which are overwhelmingly women and children. 
The failure of the Court to appreciate these points in R. v. Seaboyer,100 R. 
v. O’Connor,101 and R. v. Daviault102 led Parliament in legislative replies 
to highlight these facts, clearly with a view to directing the Court to 
defer in future constitutional challenges.103  
So in sum, the dominant narrative of the legacy of Oakes is the rise 
and collapse of simple, dichotomous categorizations meant to help the 
Court to calibrate the degree of deference according to the particular 
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 Bill C-72, S.C. 1995, c. 32, the reply to Daviault, contained similar language in its 
preamble: 
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada recognizes that violence has a particularly 
disadvantaging impact on the equal participation of women and children in society and on 
the rights of women and children to security of the person and to the equal protection and 
benefit of the law as guaranteed by sections 7, 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms; 
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada recognizes that there is a close association between 
violence and intoxication and is concerned that self-induced intoxication may be used 
socially and legally to excuse violence, particularly violence against women and children; 
… 
WHEREAS the Parliament of Canada desires to promote and help to ensure the full 
protection of the rights guaranteed under sections 7, 11, 15 and 28 of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms for all Canadians, including those who are or may be victims of 
violence … 
For commentary on Bill C-72 which emphasizes the importance of the preamble to future 
constitutional litigation, see I. Grant, “Second Chances: Bill C-72 and the Charter” (1996) 30 
O.H.L.J. 379. 
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features of each case. An interesting piece of supporting evidence is that 
in recent jurisprudence we only rarely see the quotation of the famous 
passage in Irwin Toy, whereas it was commonplace for the entire passage 
to be reproduced in the years immediately following that judgment, as a 
kind of Rosetta Stone for section 1. If we had to date the death of the 
categorical approach to section 1, it would be with Thomson Newspapers 
in 1998. In that case, a majority of the Court agreed with McLachlin J.’s 
scepticism towards Irwin Toy’s categorical distinction between criminal 
and non-criminal legislation, and went further, stating that “nothing … 
suggests that there is one category of cases in which a lower standard of 
justification under s. 1 is applied, and another category in which a higher 
standard is applied”.104 But although the categories have collapsed, they 
have survived as factors which direct, but do not determine, the judicial 
approach in individual cases. And so Thomson Newspapers recasts many 
of the categorical distinctions developed by the Court as factors to be 
weighed and balanced, without any clear criteria as to their relationship 
and relative priority. The result is a highly context-driven inquiry. 
Categories, unsuccessful on their own terms, have paved the way for 
context as the new touchstone of section 1.  
III. THE COUNTER-NARRATIVE 
The dominant narrative makes sense of much of the last 20 years of 
working with Oakes. But it misses out on another legacy of Oakes, 
which is of equal and increasing importance. 
This counter-narrative begins with Oakes itself. In many ways, the 
centrality of Oakes to the Court’s evolving experience with the Charter 
is puzzling, given the procedural history of the case. As Robert Sharpe 
and Kent Roach tell us in Brian Dickson: A Judge’s Journey,105 Oakes 
came before the Court as a garden variety criminal appeal. The lower 
court litigation gave no hint of the enormous importance of the case, and 
so, not surprisingly, no Attorneys-General intervened. Moreover, since 
the Court had not determined in advance of the hearing that this would 
be the case in which it set out the test for section 1, and the Court’s own 
stance on the role of interveners in Charter cases was still in its infancy 
and a topic of considerable internal debate, the question of scheduling a 
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re-hearing and inviting intervener submissions on this very point did not 
even arise.106 And so it was left to the parties to present arguments to the 
Court. But to the extent that the parties addressed questions of 
constitutional method, they focused largely on the interpretation of 
section 11(d), since this was also the first case concerning that 
provision. They devoted minimal attention to the methodological 
question of how section 1 should be interpreted. The hearing likewise 
focused on section 11(d). And even in the post-hearing conference, 
section 1 was not an issue. It was only later that Dickson C.J. decided to 
tackle section 1, working closely with his clerks (Joel Bakan and 
Colleen Sheppard) and Executive Legal Officer (Jim McPherson). 
Against this procedural backdrop, and with 20 years of hindsight, it 
is questionable whether the Court was wise to strike out as boldly as it 
did in Oakes.107 For in addition to setting up a stringent test of 
justification, Oakes also made empirics central to every stage of the 
Oakes test. As the Court said in a largely ignored passage: 
Where evidence is required in order to prove the constituent elements 
of a s. 1 inquiry, and this will generally be the case, it should be cogent 
and persuasive and make clear to the Court the consequences of 
imposing or not imposing the limit.108 
This passage appears to have been largely overlooked in the 
academic literature. Moreover, it has been quoted infrequently by the 
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Court — only in four Charter cases,109 whereas Oakes has been cited by 
the Court in 152 subsequent judgments.110 But it is becoming 
increasingly central to the Court’s jurisprudence. The justice most 
responsible for bringing the Court’s attention to this issue has been 
McLachlin C.J. As she explained in RJR-MacDonald, the Oakes test 
sets up a process of “reasoned demonstration”, as opposed to simply 
accepting the say-so of governments.111 By this, she meant that “[t]he s. 
1 inquiry is by its very nature a fact-specific inquiry”.112 As she 
continued: 
In determining whether the objective of the law is sufficiently 
important to be capable of overriding a guaranteed right, the court 
must examine the actual objective of the law. In determining 
proportionality, it must determine the actual connection between the 
objective and what the law will in fact achieve; the actual degree to 
which it impairs the right; and whether the actual benefit which the 
law is calculated to achieve outweighs the actual seriousness of the 
limitation of the right. In short, s. 1 is an exercise based on the facts of 
the law at issue and the proof offered of its justification, not on 
abstractions.113 
Later on, in Sauvé, McLachlin C.J. built upon these themes. She 
held that governments seeking to justify the denial of the right to vote to 
prisoners under section 1 cannot rely on “vague and symbolic 
objectives”, such as inculcating respect for the rule of law.114 Rather, 
rights can only be justifiably limited in response to concrete, precise and 
real problems or harms whose existence can be demonstrated to the 
satisfaction of a court through the normal trial process. 
Needless to say, in Oakes itself, no such factual record was before 
the Court, because the parties had no notice that they were required to 
produce one. To understand why Oakes may have been unwise, imagine 
if the Crown had known the requirements of the Oakes test in advance 
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and attempted to adduce evidence sufficient to justify the challenged 
provision. Would it have been possible to provide evidence meeting the 
civil standard of proof mandated by Oakes with respect to each 
constituent element of the test? In particular, would it have been 
possible to definitely prove that the means chosen minimally impaired 
the right to be presumed innocent — i.e., that other less intrusive means 
would not have been equally effective? Indeed, what kind of proof 
would have sufficed? The conundrum raised by this hypothetical is in 
fact a more general problem that has emerged as a central feature of 
Charter adjudication. Public policy is often based on approximations 
and extrapolations from the available evidence, inferences from 
comparative data, and, on occasion, even educated guesses. Absent a 
large-scale policy experiment, this is all the evidence that is likely to be 
available. Justice La Forest offered an observation in McKinney which 
rings true: “[d]ecisions on such matters must inevitably be the product 
of a mix of conjecture, fragmentary knowledge, general experience and 
knowledge of the needs, aspirations and resources of society”.115 
In other words, Oakes’ approach to interpreting section 1 has 
unwittingly created a major institutional dilemma for the Court, given 
the practical reality that public policy is often made on the basis of 
incomplete knowledge. In many important cases, disputes over 
justifiable limits on Charter rights have been factual disputes about the 
nature of social problems, and the effectiveness of government policy 
instruments in combating them. Although it has never been framed in 
this way, the basic question in these cases is the same: who should bear 
the risk of empirical uncertainty with respect to government activity that 
infringes Charter rights? This has become one of the unarticulated yet 
central questions in Charter litigation. It has given rise to an extensive 
jurisprudence, and is one of the principal legacies of Oakes.  
One answer would be that in a constitutional, rights-based regime, 
in which rights are the rule and of presumptive importance, limitations 
on rights are the exception, governments bear the onus of justification in 
upholding rights-infringing measures, and the state bears the risk of 
empirical uncertainty. But to set such a high bar for governments may 
be to ask too much of them. It may simply be impossible to prove with 
scientific certainty that the means chosen to combat the problem 
actually will do so, and that other, less intrusive means to tackle the 
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problem are equally effective. As La Forest J. wrote in his dissenting 
judgment in RJR-MacDonald, to require governments to bear the risk of 
empirical uncertainty “could have the effect of virtually paralyzing the 
operation of government … it will be impossible to govern … it would 
not be possible to make difficult but sometimes necessary legislative 
choices. There would be conferred on the courts a supervisory role over 
a state itself essentially inactive”.116 And so another answer would be for 
the courts to not require governments to adduce much in the way of a 
factual record at all. But this would seem to read out the requirement 
that reasonable limits be “demonstrably justified”, set out in the text of 
section 1 itself, and to ask courts to accept the say-so of governments on 
the existence of public policy problems, and the relative efficacy of 
policy instruments in dealing with them. 
The Court has struck a compromise between these two extremes. In 
cases in which there is conflicting or inconclusive social science 
evidence, the question is whether the government has a “reasonable 
basis” for concluding that an actual problem exists, that the means 
chosen would address it, and that the means chosen infringes the right as 
little as possible.117 This standard is understood as expecting something 
less of governments than definitive, scientific proof. But an absolute 
lack of evidence is unacceptable; there must be some factual basis for 
the public policy.  
A pair of examples explains how these principles have operated in 
practice. In Irwin Toy, the Court upheld a Quebec statute prohibiting 
advertising directed at children under 13 years of age, on the basis that 
children were unable to distinguish fact from fiction and were 
susceptible to manipulation. The evidence before the Court clearly 
demonstrated that children between the ages of 2 and 6 could not 
distinguish fact from fiction, whereas expert opinion was divided on at 
what point between 7 and 13 years old “children generally develop the 
cognitive ability to recognize the persuasive nature of advertising”.118 
However, this evidence, albeit inconclusive, was enough for the Court. 
As it said, the cut-off age of 13 was made “without access to complete 
knowledge”, but as long as “the legislature has made a reasonable 
assessment as to where the line is most properly drawn, especially if that 
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assessment involves weighing conflicting scientific evidence … it is not 
for the court to second guess. That would only substitute one estimate 
for another”.119 Conversely, in Ford v. Quebec,120 the Court was faced 
with a blanket requirement that commercial signage in Quebec only be 
in French. The Court held that while the evidentiary record was 
sufficient to demonstrate the importance of the government’s objective, 
there was a complete absence of evidence on the critical question of 
whether “the requirement of the use of French only is either necessary 
for the achievement of the legislative objective or proportionate to it”.121 
As a consequence, the Court found that the government had not met its 
burden of justification under section 1.122 
As Irwin Toy and Ford illustrate, the “reasonable basis” test has 
largely been worked out in the context of cases on freedom of 
expression. The Court has rejected conventional morality as an 
acceptable justification for limiting free speech, opting instead for the 
principle that speech can only be limited if it is harmful. Richard Moon 
usefully terms this the “behavioural approach”, since it posits that 
expression will encourage listeners to act in harmful ways.123 This 
interpretive choice has had the unanticipated effect of locking the Court 
into a search for evidence of the real, concrete harms of prohibited 
speech. The difficulties this has created for the Court have come home 
in its decisions on pornography and hate speech. Unable to rely on 
morality-based justifications for these laws, the Court has been 
confronted with the absence of definitive evidence demonstrating that 
these forms of speech are harmful. Wayne Sumner has recently 
reviewed the available empirical evidence, and concluded “that reliable 
evidence of harm is relatively scarce”.124 So not surprisingly, the Court 
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has had to alter the standard of proof. In three of its pornography 
decisions (Butler, Sharpe, Little Sisters) the Court has been able to point 
to some social science evidence, which satisfies the reasonable basis 
test. And in cases on hate speech (Keegstra, Ross), where such evidence 
was entirely absent, the Court has relied on “experience and common 
sense”125 and “reason or logic”126 to bridge the empirical gap. Moreover, 
common sense and logic were relied on in two of the pornography 
decisions (Butler, Sharpe) as additional support for the conclusion that 
the speech was harmful.127 
Taken together, the Court terms this approach the “reasonable 
apprehension of harm” test. But although the Court has been unanimous 
in accepting the reasonable basis test to assess inconclusive social 
science evidence, and in permitting governments to rely on common 
sense or logic to surmount evidentiary gaps, there have been significant 
disagreements in recent cases over the boundaries of these doctrines. 
Significantly, these divisions on the Court have not turned on the sorts 
of problems which arose out of the categorical distinctions which it 
developed in Irwin Toy and other cases. For example, there is no 
disagreement in these cases over how to categorize the speech in 
question, or on whether to defer under minimal impairment.  
So what is the basis of disagreement? In some cases, the 
disagreement has centred on what kinds of inferences governments are 
entitled to draw from inconclusive evidence. The most famous clash 
occurred in RJR-MacDonald, and centred on the link between tobacco 
advertising and consumption, given the absence of definitive evidence 
linking the two. The Court divided on whether governments were 
entitled to infer from the widespread use of “brand preference” and 
“informational” advertising by tobacco companies that such a link 
existed. Justice La Forest in dissent was willing to infer that by 
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convincing smokers not to quit, these advertisements had the effect of 
sustaining levels of consumption, while McLachlin J. refused to do so.128  
And the Court has also split on the circumstances in which it is 
appropriate to apply “logic” or “common sense” to surmount an absence 
of evidence. What is particularly interesting is that the Court has divided 
on this question in two cases concerning political expression, Thomson 
Newspapers and Harper. From the vantage point of the categories of 
deference set out in Irwin Toy and subsequent decisions, these were easy 
cases, because political expression lies at the core of section 2(b), and is 
a clear instance in which governments should be held to a strict standard 
of review. But although the Court agreed that political speech was at 
issue, it was nonetheless sharply divided over how to address the lack of 
definitive proof for the factual premises underlying the challenged laws. 
Although these cases have attracted minimal attention from 
constitutional scholars for their broader importance to the Court’s 
understanding of the judicial role under the Charter, they are worthy of 
close attention because they tell us that there is another legacy of Oakes.  
At the heart of the majority judgment in Thomson Newspapers was 
the concern that too broad an approach to bridging empirical gaps 
through judicial notice could undermine entirely the idea that 
governments can only justifiably limit constitutional rights to respond to 
real problems. The majority accordingly attempted to set some limits on 
when it could accept the existence of harm without evidence. It 
suggested that its common sense or logic approach to the existence of 
harm applied to hate speech and pornography because “the possibility of 
harm is within the everyday knowledge and experience of Canadians, or 
where factual determination and value judgments overlap”.129 Thus the 
majority refused to infer from the fact that opinion polls influence voter 
choice in election campaigns that inaccurate polls mislead large 
numbers of voters and have a significant impact on the outcome of an 
election, “without more specific and conclusive evidence to that 
effect”.130 It therefore found unconstitutional a publication ban on public 
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opinion polls within the final three days of a federal election campaign. 
The message was that pornography and hate speech were in a special 
and narrow category.  
But then in Harper, a divided Court disregarded this self-imposed 
limitation, and upheld restrictions on third party expenditures during 
election campaigns on the eve of the last federal vote. The justifications 
for the restrictions were to further the value of political equality (to 
equalize participation in political debate, to protect the outcome of an 
election from being distorted by third party expenditures, and to 
safeguard the public’s confidence in the electoral process) and to protect 
the integrity of spending limits for candidates and political parties. The 
majority openly acknowledged that both the alleged harm and the 
efficacy of legislative responses to it were “difficult, if not impossible, 
to measure scientifically”,131 but nonetheless was willing to reason both 
that the harm existed and that the cure was effective. The dissent, led by 
McLachlin C.J., argued that in the absence of evidence, “[t]he dangers 
posited are entirely hypothetical” and “unproven and speculative” and 
that “the legislation is an overreaction to a non-existent problem”, and 
was completely unwilling to entertain the common sense argument.132 
And these disagreements have now spilled over into cases outside 
the context of freedom of expression. Consider Figueroa, which 
concerned the right to vote protected by section 3. The Court 
unanimously found unconstitutional the 50-candidate threshold for 
federal political parties to be registered. Registered political parties 
possess the right to issue tax receipts for donations received outside the 
election period, and to extend to candidates the right to transfer unspent 
election funds to the party. Moreover, candidates of registered parties 
can include their party affiliation on an election ballot. For Iacobucci J. 
(speaking for six members of the Court), an important consideration was 
the lack of any evidence demonstrating a link between these measures 
and two of the stated objectives underlying the scheme: to improve the 
effectiveness of the electoral process, and to increase the possibility of a 
stable Parliament and better governance. But LeBel J. (speaking for 
three judges) found it “hard to imagine how one could prove 
empirically” that stable Parliaments provided better governance.133 The 
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second is Lavoie, in which the Court rejected a section 15 challenge to 
hiring preferences for Canadian citizens in the federal civil service. 
Central to the reasoning of McLachlin C.J. in her dissenting reasons 
(speaking for two judges) was that the government had adduced no 
evidence at all to demonstrate a rational connection between the hiring 
preference and the goals of encouraging non-citizens to naturalize and 
enhancing the value of Canadian citizenship. She was unwilling to 
bridge this gap through reason, logic or common sense, even though the 
doctrinal tools were available for her to do so. But Bastarache J. 
(speaking for four judges in the majority) was willing to do precisely 
that. 
In retrospect, it may have been imprudent for the Court in Oakes to 
stipulate that the evidence to justify a limitation on a Charter right must 
be “cogent and persuasive” in a case in which no government had 
attempted to grapple with this requirement and to bring to the Court’s 
attention the difficulties attendant in adducing such evidence. It is 
interesting to speculate on what the test for section 1 would have looked 
like had a re-hearing with interveners been held in Oakes, had Edwards 
Books been handed down first, or had Oakes and Edwards been heard 
and drafted together. 
IV. CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON CHAOULLI 
For the last two decades, the Court has struggled to come to terms with 
the institutional task it set itself in Oakes. In response to the question of 
who bears the risk of empirical uncertainty with respect to government 
activity that infringes Charter rights, the rights-claimant or the 
government, the answer has been, in effect, both. But even though the 
Court has agreed on this compromise, deep disagreements persist along 
its ragged edges. The Court has yet to work out under what 
circumstances it will use common sense, reason or logic to bridge an 
absence of evidence, and to delineate when it will allow inferences to be 
drawn from inconclusive social science evidence.  
Understanding these sorts of problems to be the legacy of Oakes 
also allows us to view judgments outside the section 1 context in a 
different light. I want to conclude by linking this counter-narrative to 
Chaoulli, in which the Court struck down Quebec’s ban on private 
health insurance. Although the focus of the case was section 7, Oakes 
and the jurisprudence under section 1 have an obvious relevance. To be 
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sure, the two provisions have a complicated relationship, since the 
principles of fundamental justice are an internal limit on the scope of 
section 7 which in theory could do some of the work of section 1. The 
Court recently sought to differentiate the two provisions in Malmo-
Levine, suggesting that: 
… for a rule or principle to constitute a principle of fundamental 
justice for the purposes of s. 7, it must be a legal principle about which 
there is significant societal consensus that it is fundamental to the way 
in which the legal system ought fairly to operate, and it must be 
identified with sufficient precision to yield a manageable standard 
against which to measure deprivations of life, liberty or security of the 
person.134 
By contrast, the inquiry under Oakes is rather different. 
Unfortunately, the Court has not entirely succeeded in minimizing the 
overlap between the two provisions. The key problem is that the Court 
has held that section 7 protects individuals from “arbitrary” deprivations 
of life, liberty and security of the person, where arbitrary is defined as a 
deprivation that “bears no relation to, or is inconsistent with, the 
objective that lies behind [it]”.135 This replicates the “rational 
connection” analysis of the Oakes test, albeit in a very deferential 
fashion. Chief Justice McLachlin’s reasons in Chaoulli further run the 
two provisions together by interpreting arbitrariness as connoting 
necessity — exactly the sort of inquiry mandated by Oakes. This move 
makes directly relevant to the interpretation of the principles of 
fundamental justice under section 7 the case law under section 1 
subsequent to Oakes. 
So how would my counter-narrative of Oakes have assisted the 
Court in Chaoulli? In the debate over whether governments should 
allow a parallel private system to deliver medically necessary services, 
there are two types of disagreements. The first is a disagreement at the 
level of principle, over whether individuals should be able to purchase 
faster and/or higher quality care on the private market. The second is the 
empirical disagreement over the impact of a parallel private system on 
Medicare. Quebec had defended the ban on private insurance on the 
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basis that doing so was necessary to preserve the integrity of the public 
system. This claim was the key point of disagreement between the 
majority and the dissenting judges, and, indeed, was the focus of 
extensive expert testimony at trial. Health services researchers testified 
that a parallel private system would reduce public support for the public 
plan because of the possibility of exit. Indeed, those most likely to exit 
— the wealthy — also have the greatest power to protect the public 
system, because they are disproportionately powerful politically. The 
trial court also heard testimony that a private sector would lead to the 
bleeding of human resources from the public sector, either if physicians 
leave Medicare entirely, or if physicians practising in both sectors 
prioritize their private patients. Finally, because private insurers would 
cherry-pick the healthiest and wealthiest patients, public health 
insurance would be left holding the bag for the sickest and the poorest, 
without the ability to pool risk across the entire population. 
But there was evidence on the other side. An expert witness, and an 
interim report prepared by the Standing Senate Committee on Social 
Affairs, Science and Technology pointed to the co-existence of public 
and private sectors in a number of Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries (e.g., the United 
Kingdom and New Zealand) to dispute Quebec’s claim that a ban on 
private insurance and a public monopoly were necessary to maintaining 
quality of care in the public sector. 
The trial judge made a definitive finding of fact that Quebec’s fears 
were well-founded: “We cannot act like ostriches. The result of creating 
a parallel private health care system would be to threaten the integrity, 
sound operation and viability of the public system”.136 The dissenters in 
the Supreme Court argued that absent a palpable error, the trial judge’s 
findings of fact could not be disturbed, and was equally certain in its 
conclusions: “Failure to stop the few people with ready cash does not 
pose a structural threat to the Quebec health plan. Failure to stop private 
health insurance will, as the trial judge found, do so.”137  
But the majority strenuously disagreed. Justice Deschamps, writing 
for herself, stated that the trial judgment was “based solely on the ‘fear’ 
of an erosion of services”,138 and that “no study was produced or 
                                                                                                            
136
 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2000] J.Q. no 479 at para. 263. 
137
 Chaoulli, supra, note 27, at para. 181. 
138
 Id., at para. 68. 
(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) Proportionality Analysis 533 
discussed”139 which substantiated this claim. Chief Justice McLachlin 
was even harsher, characterizing the empirical arguments both for and 
against Quebec’s ban on private health care as “competing but unproven 
‘common sense’ arguments, amounting to little more than assertions of 
belief”.140 “We are in the realm of theory”, she wrote.141 The tie-breaker 
was the evidence from OECD countries, which “refutes the 
government’s theoretical contention that a prohibition on private 
insurance is linked to maintaining quality public health care”.142 
Underlying this factual disagreement was a remarkable degree of 
agreement on the nature of the judicial role. Chief Justice McLachlin 
was clearest, stating that the courts’ task in Charter challenges to 
government policies “is to evaluate the issue in the light, not just of 
common sense or theory, but of the evidence”.143 Testable, provable 
facts drive adjudication; judges must “look to the evidence rather than to 
assumptions”.144 And for the most part, the dissenting judges defined 
their task as producing firm conclusions grounded in evidence, which 
pointed in the opposite direction. Thus, the trial judge’s definitive 
findings of fact merited deference from the Supreme Court. And the 
majority’s treatment of OECD data was dismissed as amateur public 
policy tourism. The dissenting judges’ assumption through most of its 
reasons, like the majority’s, appeared to be that governments had to 
meet a stringent test of justification; they only differed on whether that 
test had been met. 
But in an important sense, setting up the nature of judicial review in 
this way misconceived the character of the problem. The trial judge was 
too definitive in concluding that private health care posed an 
unequivocal threat to the viability of the public system, and so too was 
the majority’s position that there was an absence of evidence on the 
issue. In reality, the Court was presented with a case in which the 
evidence was inconclusive or conflicting. Consider the two most 
comprehensive studies of health care reform in recent years, the 
Romanow Commission and the Kirby Committee. On the impact of a 
parallel private system on public health care, both are equivocal. Thus, 
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the Romanow Commission states that “Private facilities … may actually 
make the situation worse for other patients because much-needed 
resources are diverted from the public health care system to private 
facilities”.145 The Kirby Committee is likewise qualified in its 
conclusions, suggesting that “allowing a parallel private system … may 
even make the public waiting lines worse”.146  
Once the problem is framed in these terms, the direct and significant 
relevance of the counter-narrative of Oakes is obvious. Indeed, given 
that McLachlin C.J. has figured prominently in Canada’s jurisprudence 
of self-doubt and empirical uncertainty — in RJR-MacDonald, in Sauvé, 
in Lavoie and in Harper — one would have expected this material to be 
front and centre in her judgment. Astonishingly, however, she does not 
even mention, let alone engage with, these cases. And it is equally 
surprising that these cases only make a cameo appearance in the 
dissent.147  
The Court’s complete failure to cite, follow, or even attempt to 
distinguish its own precedents led it to make a fundamental legal error: 
it posed the wrong question. The question was not whether Quebec had 
convincingly demonstrated that a ban on private insurance was 
necessary to maintain the integrity of public health insurance. Rather, 
the question was whether Quebec had a “reasoned apprehension of 
harm” that opening the door to private insurance would pose this threat. 
Instead of proceeding with cocksure certainty, the Court should have 
approached the constitutional challenge with self-doubt and judicial 
modesty. Mere disagreement with the Quebec government was not 
enough. The standard was whether the Quebec government lacked a 
“reasonable basis” upon which to proceed, and the materials put into 
evidence more than met this attenuated standard. The Court’s disregard 
for this evidence is nothing short of astonishing. 
Had the Court only grasped the true legacy of Oakes, perhaps it 
could have avoided this grave mistake. And if Oakes is a comparative 
model for proportionality analysis under other rights-protecting 
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constitutions, then these kinds of problems are not particular to Canada. 
More generally, what is striking about the comparative reception of 
Oakes is that neither the narrative nor counter-narrative of the legacy of 
the judgment appears to have travelled outside of Canada. Foreign 
courts would be wise to grapple with these difficulties with the benefit 
of two decades of reflection by Canadian courts instead of simply 
applying the Oakes test in its original and undeveloped form.148  
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